GUARANTEES AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
I. In my former paper, I endeavored to discuss de Colyar's third, fourth and fifth rules with regard to the kind of
promises which fall within the Statute of Frauds. These
rules I ventured to restate in the following terms:
A promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another person is primafacie within the Statute of Frauds, but by
way of exception the statute does not apply to an agreement between the surety and the creditor if the promise by the former to
the latter to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another
person is merely one incident of the agreement which has some
other main or immediate object,
And, in particular, the statute does not apply
(i) if, when the promise is made, there already exists any
liability on the part of the promisor (the surety) or of his property
except such as arises from his own express promise, or
(2) if the transaction between the promisor (the surety) and
the promisee (the creditor) amounts to a sale or surrender by the
latter to or for the benefit of the former of a security for the debt
of another or of the debt itself.
I propose now to consider some of the cases which relate to de Colyar's first and second rules.
The cases already discussed afford examples of contracts
which either are or include true contracts of guarantee, but
which have been held, on special grounds, not to be within
the statute. The cases now to be discussed afford examples
of promises which in some respects bear a misleading resemblance to contracts of guarantee but which are not within
the statute because they give rise to original or principal,
not collateral, liability on the promisor's part.
The rules in question are as follows:
i. To bring a case within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, the
primary liability of another person to the promise for the debt,
default or miscarriage to which the promise of guarantee relates
must exist or be contemplated, otherwise the statute does not apply, and the promise is then valid and can be sued on, though not
in writing.2
1
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2. The statute does not apply to any promise to be answerable for another, unless such promise is made to the creditor, that
is to say, to the person to whom another is already, or is thereafter
to become liable, and who can enforce such liability by action.4

II. It is elementary that in a contract of guarantee there
must always be three parties in contemplation:. a principal
debtor (whose liability may be actual or prospective), a
creditor, and a third party who in consideration of some act
or promise or forbearance on the part of the creditor promises
to discharge the debtor's liability if the debtor fails to do so.
The leading case as to the necessity for the liability of
a third party, i. e., the existence of a principal debtor, is
Birkmyr v. Darnell, (17O4),4 reported as follows:
Declaration, That in consideration the plaintiff would deliver his gelding to A, the defendant promised that A should redeliver him safe; and evidence was, that the defendant undertook
that A should re-deliver him safe; and this was held a collateral
undertaking for another: For where the undertaker comes in aid
only to procure a credit to the party, in that case there is a remedy
against both, and both are answerable according to their distinct
engagements; but where the whole credit is given to the undertaker, so that the other party is but as his servant, and there is no
remedy against him, this is not a collateral undertaking; but it is
otherwise in the principal case, for the plaintiff may maintain detinue upon the bailment, against the original hirer, as well as assumpsit upon the promise against this defendant.
It appears from the fuller report of the case in Lord Raymond's Reportss that upon the argument, Holt, C. J. with
Powell and Gould, J. J. seemed to be of the opinion, against
Powys, J., that the case was not within the statute, because
English (to whom the horse was delivered upon the defendant's promise that it should be re-delivered) was not liable
on the contract, for if any action could be maintained against
English, it must be for a subsequent wrong in detaining the
horse or actually converting it to his own use, and Powell, J.,
said "that that rule, of what things shall be within the statute, is not confined to those cases only, where there is no
3 Halsbury, op. cit., vol. 15, par. 891; de Colyar, op. cit., p. 66, rule 2.
4 I Salk. 27; I Sm. Lead Cas. (ii
Ed.) 299.

2 Lord Raym. xo85, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 12, sub noam. Birkmyr
v. Darnall.
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remedy at all against the other, but where there is not any
remedy against him on the same contract."
"The last day of the term the Chief Justice delivered
the opinion of the court. He said, that the question had
been proposed at a meeting of judges, and that there had
been great variety of opinions between them, because the
horse was lent wholly upon the credit of the defendant; but
that the judges of this court were all of opinion, that the case
was within the statute. The objection that was made was,
that if English did not re-deliver the horse, he was not chargeable in an action upon the promise, but in trover or detinue,
which are founded upon the tort, and are for a matter subsequent to the agreement. But I answered, that English
may be charged on the bailment in detinue on the original
delivery, and a detinue is the adequate remedy, and upon
the delivery English is liable in detinue, and consequently
this promise by the defendant is collateral, and is within the
reason, and the very words of the statute; and is as much
so, as if, where a man was indebted, J. S., in consideration
that the debtee would forbear the man, should promise to pay
him the debt, such a promise is void 6 unless it be in writing."
De Colyar 7 properly refers to the case of Birkmyr v.
Darnell as raising a doubt as to the applicability of the sta-tute to a promise to be responsible for the future wrongful
act or tort of a third person,8 but it is not easy to follow the
reasoning of his statement that "Any doubt that may have
been caused by these observations of Justice Powell, or by
the decision in Read v. Nash, 9 was certainly entirely removed
by the case of Kirkham v. Marter."10 In neither of the
two last mentioned cases was a promise given in respect of
the future liability in tort of a third person.
In Kirkham v. Marter the defendant's son without
leave or license, had ridden the plaintiff's horse, thereby
6 Strictly speaking, "void" should be "unenforceable."
The mistake is
not uncommon in the older cases.
7 Op. cit., pp. 62, 63.
8 Because the court was at such pains to find a liability in contract.
9 (1751), 1 Wils. 3o5, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 25.
10 (I8ig), 2 B. & Ald. 613, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 23.
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causing the horse's death. In consideration of the plaintiff's
refraining from suing the defendant's son for damages for
the wrongful act, the defendant promised to pay certain
sums to the plaintiff. It was held that the defendant's undertaking was a promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another within the statute, and was therefore
unenforceable because it was not in writing.
In the earlier case of Read v. Nash it appeared that the
defendant Nash had promised one Tuack to pay £5o and
the costs of an action brought by Tuack against one Johnson
for assault and battery, in consideration that Tuack should
not proceed to trial but should withdraw his record. Tuack
withdrew the record, and his executor Read brought action
against Nash upon his promise. Lee, C. J., delivered the
judgment of the court as follows:
"The single question is, whether this promise, which is confessed by the demurrer not to have been in writing, is within the
Statute of Frauds and Perjuries; that is to say, whether it be a
promise for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person;
and we are all of opinion that it is not, but that it is an original
promise sufficient to found an assumpsit upon against Nash, and
is a lien upon Nash, and upon him only. Johnson was not a debtor, the cause was not tried, he did not appear to be guilty of any
default or miscarriage, there might have been a verdict for him if
the cause had been tried for anything we can tell; he never was
liable to the particular debt, damages, or costs. The true difference is between an original promise and a collateral promise; the
first is out of the statute, the latter is not when it is to pay the debt
of another which was already contracted."
De Colyar" submits that the distinction between the
two cases is perfectly clear. "In Read v. Nash the promise
simply was, forbear to proceed with the action you have commenced against A. and I will pay you £5o. In Kirkham v.
Marter it was, do not make A. pay for his default, and I will
do so myself."
The distinction between an original undertaking and a
collateral undertaking is of course fundamental, and it is
true that Read v. Nash was distinguished in Kirkham v.
Marter on the ground that in the former case the undertakSOp.

cit., p. 87.
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ing was an original one. while in the latter it was collateral.
The difficulty is to find any such distinction in either the
form or the substance of the promises in the two cases in
question. The only substantial difference12 in the facts is
that in Kirkham v. Marter the liability of the third party
was admitted, whereas in Read v. Nash it was not admitted.
There is however no reason for assuming in the latter case
that the action against the third party was groundless, in
view of the fact that Nash promised to pay £5o and the
costs in order to prevent it from being brought to trial.
In Fish v. Hutchinson 13 it appeared that an action had
been commenced by the plaintiff against one A, and the defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff would stay his
action, promised to pay the money owing by A. It was
held that the promise was within the statute. Read v.
Nash was distinguished on the ground that in that case it
was doubtful whether there was the existing liability of a
third party, whereas in Fish v. Hutchinson there was the
debt of another still existing and a promise to pay it.
De Colyar4 says, "It is quite possible to distinguish
Read v. Nash from Fish v. Hutchinson. For in Read v.
Nash the promise of the defendant was to pay £50 and costs.
On the other hand in Kirkham v. Marter and Fish v. Hutch-'
inson, the defendants promised not to pay the plaintiff a
fixed sum of money, but something that a third person was
liable to pay."
It is respectfully submitted that the above mentioned
efforts to distinguish Read v. Nash from the later cases are
not productive of any tangible or profitable result. The
distinction between an admittedly valid claim against a
third party and a claim which, though not admitted, is
asserted by action or otherwise seriously maintained, seems
to be unreasonable and unsatisfactory as a test of the applicability of the statute to the promise made by the defendant.
2
1 Subject to the question whether in Read v. Nash the liability of Johnson was extinguished. See the case of Bird v. Gammon, infra.

13 (1759), 2 Wils. 94.
14

Op. cit., p. 88.

142

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

If the claim against the third party is admittedly invalid,
cadit quaestio, because there is no principal debt to which the
defendant's promise can be collateral. But it seems unreasonable to assume the invalidity of the claim against
the third party for the purpose of making liable, as on an
original promise, a person whose promise is made with respect to that claim.
As regards the sufficiency of the consideration for a
guarantee it has been held that if A believes in good faith
that he has a fair chance of success, a reasonable ground
for suing B, and forbears to sue B on the faith of C's promise to pay, C will be bound if his promise is evidenced as
required by the statute. 15 It would seem reasonable that
in such a case B's promise to pay either the amount of A's
claim against B, or a definite sum of money, in consideration
of A's forbearance, should prima facie be considered a collateral promise-a promise to answer for the debt, default
or miscarriage of another person.2 Whether the claim
against B would have been held valid in an action by A
against B or not, it is at least a claim which C considers to
be a sufficient foundation for his promise. In such a case
it seems unsatisfactory to make the enforceability of C's
promise depend upon the validity of the claim against B,
because the result would be to impose upon the court which
has to pass upon the enforceability of A's claim against the
defendant C the necessity of passing also upon the validity
of a disputed claim by A against B, although B may not
be a party to the action and the court may not have before
it adequate material for deciding the question of B's liability.
It may be noted that in the Massachusetts case of
Dexter v. Blanchard 17 the court repudiated the doctrine that

Is See, e. g., Callischer v. Bischoffsheim, (187o) L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; Miles v.
New Zealand Alford Estate Co., (1886) 32 Ch. D. 266; Drewry v. Percival,
(19o9) i9 0. L. R. 463.
16 Always assuming that the claim against B is not extinguished as a result
of the transaction between A and C.
17 11 Allen (93 Mass.) 365 (1865), Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 26. This
was said, however, in a case in which the principal debtor was an infant and the
debt was not for necessaries. There are cases both in England and the United
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an oral agreement to answer for the debt of another would
be enforceable if it could be shown that the original contracting party could have established a good defense to the debt
in an action against him.
It seems better to say that Read v. Nash was in effect
overruled by Kirkham v. Marter,1s or in other words that
the decision in Read v. Nash that the promise there in question was an original, not a collateral, promise was wrong on
the facts, and that the case is indistinguishable from Kirkham v. Marter, in which the promise was clearly collateral.
This conclusion is, however, to be read subject to the construction put upon Read v. Nash in the case of Bird v.
Gammon'9 in which the earlier case was expressly followed.
One Lloyd, being an execution debtor of the plaintiff, conveyed all his property to the defendant, the defendant
undertaking to pay Lloyd's creditors. The plaintiff then,
with the consent of Lloyd and the defendant, withdrew his
execution. It was held that the defendant's undertaking
was not a promise to pay the debt of a third person, but an
agreement that if the plaintiff would forego his claim on
Lloyd, the defendant would pay the amount of the debt on
his own account. It was objected that the plaintiff, if he
failed in this action, might still sue Lloyd or issue execution;
but it was answered by Tindal, C. J., "if he were to do so,
Lloyd might show, on plea or audita querela, that on good
consideration the plaintiff gave up his remedy against Lloyd,
and took the defendant's liability instead; which though
not properly accord and satisfaction, would be a complete
defense on the general issue; Good v. CheesemanO and the
cases there cited." The.case was therefore decided on the
States in which it has been held that in such a case the promise is an original
one and outside the statute by reason of the absence of any principal debt.
Harris v. Huntbach, (I75I) 1 Burr. 373; Chapin v. Lapham, 20 Pick. (37 Mass.)
467 (1838); Downey v. Hinchman, 25 Ind. 453 (1865). Probably a distinction
must be made between the contract of an infant which is merely voidable and
one upon which it is legally impossible for him to incur personal liability. Halsbury. Laws of England, vol. 15, p. 45918See note to Forth v. Stanton, Wms. Saunders (1871 ed.) 231.
19(1837) 3 Bing, N. C. 883, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 29.
20 (1831) 2 B. & Ad. 328.
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ground that there had been novation and an extinguishment
of the original debtor's liability.
Of course if the effect of the promise is to extinguish
the liability in respect of which the promise is made, the
promise must be an original promise. It cannot be a collateral promise if there is no continuing liability of another
to which it is collateral. But it is to be observed that in
Bird v. Gammon the court has virtually invented a new
ground of justification for Read v. Nash. If the effect of
Nash's promise and the withdrawal of the record in the
action against Johnson was to extinguish Johnson's liability
to be sued, then clearly Nash's promise was an original
promise for which no writing was required. But this view
of Read v. Nash puts it in a different class of cases. Looked
at in this way, it is no longer a decision that the defendant's
promise was original because Johnson's liability to the plaintiff was uncertain, as put in the case itself, and it is no longer
difficult to distinguish it from Kirkham v. Marter and Fish v.
Hutchinson. In each of the latter cases we must assume
that the liability in respect of which the promise was made
was not extinguished by the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant, otherwise the decision would be
clearly wrong as the decision in Read v. Nash would be
clearly right.
In Goodman v. Chase 21 the plaintiffs having recovered
judgment and sued out a ca. sa. under which the defendant's
son was arrested, the defendant promised to pay the damages and costs. It was held that the promise was an original
promise in consideration of the discharge of the debt as
between the plaintiffs and the defendant's son. It will be
observed that this case was a simple one in this respect,
that there was no question but that the debt was discharged
as a result of the transaction between the plaintiffs and the
defendant, because the discharge of the defendant's son
from custody with the plaintiff's consent operated in law as
"' (I8x8) I B. & Aid. 297, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 27; cf. Eden v.
Chaffee, r6o Mass. 225 (1843); Bailey v. Gillies (1902) 4 0. L. R. 182, at p.
I9o.
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a discharge of the debt. The defendant alone was liable
and his promise was necessarily original, not collateral. It
was therefore unnecessary to consider whether the memorandum signed by the defendant was sufficient under the
2
statute.
The cases already mentioned leave open the question
whether a promise to answer for the future liability in tort of
another person is within the statute. In Kirkham v. Marter
the liability was purely tortious, but the wrongful act had
been already committed when the defendant's promise was
made. In Birkmyr v. Darnell the liability which was the
subject of the promise was merely contemplated when the
promise was made, but the court found it possible to regard
it as a liability arising out of contract.
It is interesting to note, however, in connection with
Birkmyr v. Darnell, that whether or not the action of detinue
is technically an action founded on contract, it has been
held in modern times that where a person is sued in detinue
for holding goods to which another person is entitled, the
real cause of action in fact is a wrongful act, and not a breach
of contract, because it may arise when there is no contract,
and the remedy sought is not a remedy which arises upon a
23
breach of contract.
It is probable in any case that the words of the statute
are wide enough to cover a promise to answer for the future
24
wrongful act of a third person not arising out of a contract,
but in practice a promise to answer for the future default
2 The sufficiency of the memorandum was disputed on the authority of
Wain v. Warlters, (1804) 5 East Io, which was long regarded as of doubftul
authority, but was at last confirmed by Saunders v. Wakefield, (1821) 4 B. &
Ald. 505; De Colyar, op. cit., pp. 163-4. By statute in England (19 & 20 V.
c. 97, s. 3) and in Ontario (R. S. 0. 1914, c. io2, s. 6) the consideration for a
guarantee need not now appear in the memorandum.
2 Bryant v. Herbert, (1878) 3 C. P. D. 389, C. A., reversing 3 C. P. D. 189.
The question what was the nature of the action of detinue had been an open
question for several centuries. See Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 2nd
ed., vol. 2, p. I8o. Anson (Contract, I4th ed. 1917, p. 62, 3rd Am. ed. 1919,
p. 74) adds: "Detinue is in fact founded in bailment, but the contract of bailment imposes general common law duties the breach of which may be treated,
and should be treated, as a wrong. The judgment of Collins, L. J., in Turner v.
Stallibras (1898) I Q. B. 59, states this clearly."
214As to the different meanings suggested for the words "debt," "default"
and "miscarriage" see Halsbury, Laws of England, vol. i5, p. 455, note (s).
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or miscarriage of another person usually refers to some contractual liability of that other person.
The cases in which the guarantee precedes the liability
of the principal debtor, that is, in which the guarantee is
given in order to obtain credit for another person, raise
some questions which require special consideration.
As Street points out,2 5 it seems strange that it did not
occur to the courts, when the interpretation of the statute
was yet open, that the words "to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another" contemplated only claims
already in existence at the time the collateral promise is
made. "It will be noticed that all personal engagements by
the representatives of a deceased person must necessarily
be collateral to existing claims. Strong reasons may be
advanced for believing that the succeeding clause contemplated the same situation. The reason of the statute
certainly does not apply with as much force where the guaranty is given before the principal obligation is incurred as
where the collateral promise is made afterwards; for the
guaranty almost invariably draws the consideration, e. g.,
the credit from the promisee.
"Recognition of the distinction just stated would have
made the clause in question vastly less radical than it actually
proved to be. Lord Mansfield had the acumen to perceive
that the statute did not apply to any case where the promise
sued on induced the creation of the principal obligation.26
Upon further consideration, however, this distinguished judge
found that the law was already settled differently and that
the rule was too firmly fixed to be shaken.27 At a later day,
Buller, J. had occasion to lament that the question was no
longer open for consideration."2s
In Jones v. Cooper29 Lord Mansfield, at the close of
the argument, said, "The general distinction is a clear one,
25 Foundations of Legal Liability (I9O6), vol. 2, p. 188; cf. de Colyar; op.
di., pp. lO8-1o9.
26 Mawbrey v. Cunningham, (1773) cited in Jones v. Cooper (next note).
27
Jones v. Cooper, (1774) Cowp. 228, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 2.
28Matson v. Wharam, (I787) 2 T. R. 8o. See language of Parker, C. J., in
Perley v. Sprini, 12 Mass. 297 (x815), afterwards disapproved in Cahill v. Bige-.
low, i8 Pick. (35 Mass.) 369 (1836).
" Ubi supra.
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and upon that distinction the case which has been cited
(Mawbrey v. Cunningham) was determined. Where the
undertaking is before delivery, and there is a direction to
deliver the goods, and 'I will see them paid for,' it is not
within the Statute of Frauds. But there may be a nicety
where the undertaking is before delivery, and yet conditional
as this is. It turns simply upon the undertaking being in
case the other did not pay. We will look into it." On the
following day he delivered the unanimous opinion of the
court that the ptomise by the defendant to pay, if Smith
did not, was a collateral undertaking within the statute.
In Peckham v. Faria3 the promise-" You may not only
ship that parcel, but one, two, or three thousand more, and
I will pay you if he does not "-was in form indistinguishable
from that in Jones v. Cooper, and the same result was reached.
Lord Mansfield said:
" Before the case of Jones v. Cooper I thought there was a
solid distinction between an undertaking after credit given and
an original undertaking to pay; and that, in the latter case, the
surety, being the object of the confidence, was not within the statute; but in Jones v. Cooper, the court was of opinion that wherever a man is to be called upon only in the second instance, he is
within the statute; otherwise, where he is to be called upon in its
first instance."
In Matson v. Wharamm' the defendant asked Matson,
one of the plaintiffs, if he was willing to serve one Robert
Coulthard of Pontefract with groceries; he answered that
they dealt with nobody in that part of the country and did
not know Coulthard; to which the defendant replied, "If
you do not know him you know me, and I will see you paid."
Matson then said he would serve Coulthard; and the defendant answered, "He is a good chap, but I will see you
paid." A letter was afterwards received by the plaintiffs
from Coulthard containing an order for goods, and the goods
were sent to Coulthard accordingly. The goods were charged
to Coulthard in the plaintiff's books. They wrote to Coulthard for payment, and getting no answer they applied to
:1 (1781) 3 Doug. 13.
"(1787) 2 T. R. 80.
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the defendant, who refused to pay. In form, it will be
observed, the promise was indistinguishable from that in
Mawbrey v. Cunningham, and therefore it was not open
to the court to distinguish the cases upon the ground put
forward by Lord Mansfield in Jones v. Cooper. It was
necessary either to follow or to overrule Mawbrey v. Cunningham, and the court chose the latter alternative. Buller,
J. said, "If this were a new question, the leaning of my mind
would be the other way; for Lord Mansfield's reasoning in
the case of Mawbrey and Cunningham struck me very
forcibly. But the authorities are not now to be shaken;
and the general line now taken is, that if the person for
whose use the goods are furnished be liable at all, any other
promise by a third person to pay that debt must be in writing, otherwise it is void by the statute of frauds, 29 Car. 2,
c . 3. "
In the same sense in Birkmyr v. Darnelll3 it had been
already pointed out that "where the whole credit is given
to the undertaker, so that the other party is but as his servant, and there is no remedy against him, this is not a collateral undertaking," and the report in Salkeld closes with
the following illustration:
"Et per cur. If two come to a shop, and one buys, and the
other, to gain him credit, promises the seller, If he does not pay you,
I will, this is a collateral undertaking, and void without writing,
by the Statute of Frauds. But if he says, let him have the goods,
I will be your paymaster, or I will see you paid, this is an undertaking as for himself, and he shall be intended to be the very buyer,
and the other to act but as his servant."
From a comparison of the last illustration given in
Birkmyr v. Darnell with the words of the undertaking in
Matson v. Wharam, it results that the form of words used
is only prima facie a test of the nature of the promise. As
expressed by Brewer, J. in delivering the judgment of the
33
Supreme Court of the United States in Davis v. Patrick,
"the real character of the promise does not depend alto32 (17o4)
33 141

1 Salk. 27.
U. S. 479 (1891).
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gether upon the form of expression, but largely on the situatibn of the parties."
On the one hand; the promise may be absolute in form,
Prima facie implying original liability, as "I will see you
paid" or "I will be your paymaster." It may nevertheless
be shown that credit is in fact given by the promisee to
a third party, who becomes personally liable, and that the
3
promisor's liability is really collateral. In Keate v. Temple, 4
for instance, the defendant, a first lieutenant in the Navy,
serving on the ship Boyne, promised to see the plaintiff
paid for clothing to be supplied to the crew. A verdict in
favor of the plaintiff was held to be against the weight of
evidence, the court considering that credit was given to
the crew in the first instance.
On the other hand, the promisor may use language
prima facie implying that some one else is bound, as "I will
pay if A does not pay." The implication that the promise
is collateral may nevertheless be rebutted by proof that
cred-.t was given solely to the promisor or that there was in
fact no principal liability to which the promisor's liability
could be collateral, as, for instance, where goods are furnished to a third person on the credit of the promise but
the third person gives no order or does not become liable at
all. In Mease v. Wagner 3s the defendant promised to pay
for certain articles for the funeral of Mrs. Bradley, saying,
"Charge them to the estate of Dr. Bradley, and as soon
as his nephew comes to town he will pay for them, or I will."
As neither the estate of Dr. Bradley nor his nephew was
liable, the defendant's promise was held to be an original
undertaking and therefore not within the statute.
If the promise sued on embodies the only liability
arising out of the transaction in respect of which the promise
is made, the promisor's liability is necessarily original, and
the statute does not apply. Street' refers to the illustrations
given in Birkmyr v. Darnell, and adds, "This rule has been
34(1797) I B. & P. 458.
35 (1821) I McCord (S. C.) 395, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 20.
36Foundations of Legal liability (19o6) vol. 2, pp. I85-6.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

150

LAW REVIEW

reduced to greater certainty, though possibly not without
some violence to principle, by holding that the credit must
be extended solely to the promisor in order to keep the
statute from applying. Therefore, if any credit at all is
given to the purchaser, the promise must be in writing.37
In cases of this kind, where one party is said to come in
aid to procure credit for another, it is possible for the tradesman to give credit to them both jointly. If this be done,
both are liable as debtors and no writing is necessary."38
The leading modern English case is Lakeman v. Mountstephen. 3' The plaintiff Mountstephen, a contractor and
builder, had completed for the board of health of the town
of Brixham a main sewer in the town, and the board, under
statutory authority, had given notice to the owners of certain houses directing them to connect their drains with
the main sewer and stating that if they failed to make the
connections the board would do so at their expense. The
householders did not obey the order, and the surveyor of
the board asked the plaintiff to procure the material and
do the work. The plaintiff declined to do either unless
the board would be responsible for the payment. An order
of the board was given as to the material and the plaintiff
procured the necessary piping, but still declined to do the
work. Some days afterwards a conversation took place between the plaintiff and the defendant Lakeman, the chairman of the board. 40 Lakeman said, "What objections have
you to make these connections?" The plaintiff answered,
31 Matson v. Wharam, supra.
5

Swift v. Pierce, 13 Allen (95 Mass.) 136 (1866); Gibbs v. Blanchard,

I5 Mich. 292 (1867); Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 4; Wainwright v. Straw, 15
Vt. 215 (1843).

19(x874) L. R. 7 H. L. 17, Ames' Cases on Suretyship 14, affirming the
decision of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, L. R. 7 Q. B. 196, which had reversed the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, L. R. 5 Q. B. 613 (Mountstephen v. Lakeman).
40The words of this conversation are taken from the judgment of Lord
Cairns, L. C. The plaintiff's version alone is material, because the jury found
a verdict for the plaintiff, and the only question in the appellate courts was
whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury of an enforceable promise.
The Queen's Bench directed a nonsuit to be entered on the ground that the
defendant's words under the circumstances amounted only to a promise to pay
if the board did not. On appeal the Exchequer Chamber reversed this decision.
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"I have no objection to do the work if you or the local board
will give me the order." Lakeman replied, "Mountstephen,
you go on and do the work, and I will see you paid." The
plaintiff thereupon did the work and charged the account
to the board, and upon its refusal to pay brought action
against the defendant. It was held that Lakeman had
undertaken to pay personally, the liability being an original
liability to which the statute did not apply.
Lord Cairns considered that the natural meaning of
the plaintiff's words was that he would do the work either
if he had a formal order from the board or if he had a personal order from Lakeman, and that Lakeman gave him a
personal order. Lakeman thus rendered himself personally
liable in the first instance, and neglected afterwards to protect himself by obtaining'from the board a formal order and
4"
acting and paying under that order.
Lord Selborne, in the course of his concurring opinion,
said,
"There are some observations in the opinions of the learned
judges of the Queen's Bench which certainly do look at first sight
as if some of those learned judges thought that there might be a
valid contract of suretyship,--although there might be in truth
no principal debtor. If that was the view of the learned judges,
with all respect to them, I must confess myself unable to follow it.
There can be no suretyship unless there be a principal debtor, who
of course may be constituted in the course of the transaction by
matters ex postfacto, and need not be so at the time, but until there
is a principal debtor there can be no suretyship. Nor can a man
guarantee anybody else's debt unless there is a debt of some other
person to be guaranteed. "42
The foregoing cases illustrate the first rule,43 that a

promise is not within the statute unless there is an existing
41
1In other words no credit was given to the board. In this sense the
case was followed in Ontario in Petrie v. Hunter, (1884) io 0. A. R. 127, and
Simpson v. Dolan, (igo8) I6 0. L. R. 459. The last mentioned case was distinguished on the facts in McWilliam v. Sovereign Bank, (I9O9) 14 0. W. R.
561. In Gillies v. Brown, (1916) 53 Can. S. C. R. 557, affirming Brown v. Coleman Development Co., (1915) 35 0. L. R. 219, it was held on the facts that the
promise made by the defendant Gillies to repay to the plaintiff money advanced
by the4 latter for the benefit of the defendant company was not within the statute.
2Lakeman v. Mountstephen was distinguished in Ontario in Bond v.

Treahey, (1875).37 U. C. R. 36o, and James v. Balfour, (1882) 7 0. A. R. 461,

the promises being similar in terms but-there being a continuing liability of a
third person.
': That is, de Colyar's first rule, stated at the beginning of this paper.

152

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
0

or contemplated liability of a third person to which the
promise is collateral. On the same principle, a promise to
procure the signature of a third person to a guarantee is
not within the statute, this not being a promise to answer
for another, 44 though a promise to give a guarantee in the
4
future is within the statute. "
III. The second rule46 requires that a promise, to be
within the statute, shall be made to the creditor of the third
person. Thus a promise made to a debtor to pay what he
47
owes or is liable for is not within the statute.
It has also been held that a promise to a firm of which
the promisor is a member to pay what a third person owes
to the firm, if the third person fails to pay, is not within
the statute. Such a promise is not a promise to the creditors, or at least not one which the creditors could enforce
at law, but is a promise by one partner to his co-partners
to make good to the firm the loss if a debtor of the firm
48
fails to pay what he owes to the firm.

There remains one difficult class of cases which illustrate the rule that the promise must be made to the creditor.
The so-called indemnity cases oblige us further to define
the rule by saying that the promise must be made to the
creditor in his capacity as creditor. The promise under
the statute "must be distinguished from a contract of indemnity, or promise to save another harmless from the result
of a transaction into which he enters at the instance of the
promisor."49

The leading case as to a contract of indemnity is Thomas
v. Cook.50 A and B dissolved partnership, it being agreed
44Bushell

v. Beaven. (1834) 1 Bing. N. C. lO3, Ames' Cases on Surety-

ship, 21.
'. Mallet v, Bateman, (1865) L. R. 1 C. P. 163, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 56.
46De Colyar's second rule, stated at the beginning of this paper.
47 Eastwood v. Kenyon, (1840) II A. & E. 438, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 32; Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Den. (N. Y.) 45 (1846). So, if the promise is
made to one who is neither creditor nor debtor. Reader v. Kingham, (1862)
13 C. B. N. S.344.
48 In re Hoyle, Hoyle v. Hoyle, (1893) I Ch. 84.
49Anson on Contract, 14th ed. (1917), p. 8o, 3rd Am. ed. 1919, p. 95-

60(1828) 8 B. & C. 728, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 48; cf. Harrison v.
Sawtel, io John. (N. Y.) 242 (1813), Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 54.
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that A should take upon himself the payment of cerfain
debts and that a bond should be executed by A and two othei
persons to save B harmless from the payment of the debts.
Thereafter the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant,
executed a bond together with the defendant and A, the
defendant orally promising the plaintiff to save him harmless from any payments which he might have to make under
the bond. The plaintiff was afterwards compelled to pay
under the bond and sued the defendant. It was held that
the defendant's promise to indemnify the plaintiff was not
within the statute.
A different conclusion was reached in Green v. Cresswell, 51but the last mentioned case was disapproved in Wildes
v. Dudlow,52 and other cases, and finally Thomas v. Cook
and Wildes v. Dudlow were approved and followed in the
important case of Guild v. Conrad.53
The case of Guild v. Conrad is particularly instructive,
because it affords an illustration of both an indemnity and
a guarantee, and it is admittedly very near the line. The
plaintiff (William Binney) carried on business under the
name of Guild & Co. in London. He was in correspondence
with a Demerara firm of Conrad, Wakefield & Co., one of
the partners in which was a son of the defendant Julius
Conrad. By a letter of June, i888, the defendant agreed
to guarantee payment up to £5000, of drafts made by the
Demerara firm upon the plaintiff and accepted by him if
funds should not be provided at maturity by the drawers.
There is no question but that that was a guarantee in the
proper sense of the term, that is, an undertaking to be responsible up to £5oo0 if the Demerara firm should make
default. That undertaking was in writing; but in March,
189i, the defendant orally agreed to increase the guarantee
to £6ooo in consideration of the plaintiff's agreeing to increase the credit of the Demerara firm to £ioooo. The
51 (1839) io A. & E. 453, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 49.
52 (1874) L. R. i9 Eq. 198, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 52; cf. Tighe v.

Morrison, 116 N. Y. 263 (1889).
5 (I894) 2 Q.B. 885.
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plaintiff claimed the increased amount under this oral guarantee, but the trial judge (Mathew, J.) held this part of the
action not maintainable because of the Statute of Frauds,
and no appeal was taken from this part of his judgment. The
plaintiff also claimed upon an oral promise of the defendant
made in December, 189i, and another made in January,
1892, when some bills drawn by the Demerara firm were
coming due which the plaintiff was unwilling to accept in
view of the overdrawn state of the firm's account. The
evidence was conflicting as to what was said at the interviews which took place between the plaintiff and the defendant on these two occasions, but the trial judge found that
the defendant promised the plaintiff that if the plaintiff
accepted the bills drawn by the defendant's son's firm, the
defendant would provide funds to enable the plaintiff to
meet the bills at maturity, and held that the defendant's
promise was not a contract to pay if the firm did not pay,
because there was no expectation that the firm would be
able to pay. On the faith of that promise the plaintff
accepted the bills. The Court of Appeal, affirming the
trial judge, held that the defendant was liable, following
the case of Thomas v. Cook, and some later cases.
Street 54 says, "This class of cases has given a great
deal of trouble, for it often happens that two antagonistic
elements are found in the transaction, one of which would
seem to show that the undertaking is independent and therefore not within the statute, while the other would as clearly
indicate that the statute applies. Thus, the giving by C
to A of a promise to indemnify him for some act of his own
may occur in a case where there is an implied obligation on
the part of B also to indemnify him for the same act. As
we have already seen, a promise to satisfy an obligation
which is already valid as against another is almost necessarily within the statute. These two antagonistic factions
have led to confusion and conflict."
64Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (19o6), vol. 2, pp. 186-187. The
author then refers to Thomas v. Cook, Green v. Cresswell, and some of the
decisions overruling Green v. Cresswell.
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Guild v. Conrad, though not cited by the author of
the passage just quoted, is a striking example of a case in
which antagonistic elements are found. The fact that as
a result of the defendant's promise a further credit was in
effect to be given by the plaintiff to a third person, who would
thereby become subject to a further liability, might have
been considered by the court as a ground for regarding the
defendant's promise as collateral, but the court found in
the transaction other elements indicating that the promise
was original. On the other hand, if the liability of the
third party is existing, not merely in contemplation, at
the time of the defendant's promise, it would appear to
be impossible to regard the transaction as a contract of
indemnity.
On the point last mentioned it will be sufficient, in
conclusion, to refer to the English case of Harburg v. Martin, s5 and the earlier Ontario case of Beattie v. Dinnick," 6
which were similar in their circumstances, and in each of
which it was unsuccessfully argued that the transaction
amounted to a contract of indemnity. The facts of Harburg v. Martin have already been mentioned. 57 In Beattie
v. Dinnick the plaintiff was the holder of a promissory
note made by a limited company payable three months
after date, which note was a renewal of a former note. The
action against the defendant Dinnick was based upon an
oral promise made by the defendant to the plaintiff at or
about the maturity of the earlier note to the effect that if
the plaintiff would forbear to sue the company upon the
note and would renew it, the defendant would see that the
plaintiff got his money. A divisional court held, reversing
the judgment at the trial, that the promise was within
the statute. Street, J., delivering the judgment of the
court, said, 58

"The distinction between a promise to pay a debt already
due a creditor, or one to be created upon the faith of the promise
55(1go2) i K. B. 778.
51(1896) 27 0. R. 285.
57In my former paper, supra, p. 4.
58Beattie v. Dinnick, 27 0. R. 285, at p. 293.
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on the one hand; and a promise that if the promise will incur a
liability the promisor will indemnify him against it on the other
hand, is not at all a shadowy one, and when the terms of the statute and the interpretation placed upon it by undisputed cases are
considered, the reasons for holding the latter class of promises to
be unaffected by it, while holding the former class to be within it,
seem to be unanswerable. It has been well settled that the statute applies only to promises made to the person who is or is because of the promise made to him, to become creditor, and
does"
59
not apply to promises made to the debtor or any one else.
"The promise intended by the statute is therefore a promise
made to a creditor or intending creditor in that capacity. But
where the promise is made to one who is not a creditor, that if he
will incur a liability to some third person, the promisor will indemnify him against it, it is not made to him as a creditor at all,
but rather in the character which he is asked to assume of debtor
to the third person."
John Delatre Falconbridge.
69Eastwood v. Kenyon, supra;Wildes v. Dudlow, supra.

